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TEACHING CIVIL PROCEDURE THROUGH ITS TOP TEN CASES, 
PLUS OR MINUS TWO 
KEVIN M. CLERMONT* 
The thesis is that Civil Procedure teachers should give more attention to 
the subject’s landmark cases.  Law teachers’ common sense and cognitive 
scientists’ schema theory lend support to that thesis.  The pedagogic 
implications of that thesis call for an enriched case method, the essence of 
which is teaching a slightly smaller number of cases and pausing on the key 
ones, thoroughly examining them in a rich context.  The optimal sources of 
that context are written case studies, assigned as intermittent supplementation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
My thesis is a simple one: we Civil Procedure law teachers give too little 
attention to the landmark cases.  And I include myself in this indictment. 
Instead of savoring these choice morsels, we gulp them down.  The 
incentives to rush through the landmark cases of Civil Procedure are manifold.  
We all feel the pressure to achieve coverage, obviously, as ours is a rich and 
broad subject.  Moreover, we want to get to the latest doctrinal wrinkle, which 
absorbs our current interest.  Or we want to reach today’s hot topics, those that 
matter in the real world.  Or we want to expound the latest insightful theory. 
Most of us rationally understand that surrendering to such temptations is 
not the path to good teaching, and so we should be able to resist them.  But still 
we rush through the great cases.  The reason, I think, is that something more 
subtle and powerful propels us.  My recently developed belief is that because 
we think we understand our own subject, we beneficently incline to share our 
understanding of the big picture with our students.  Individual cases are just 
points in our big picture.  We want to convey the overall vision of that 
pointillist picture, not merely the cases themselves.  That natural inclination to 
share our vision is almost irresistible, but it can maim good teaching. 
It is true enough that teaching the same subject for a number of years will 
produce expertise, in the sense of highly structured knowledge.  Psychologists 
call each structured subunit of that general structure a schema.1  We teachers 
 
* Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University.  I would like to thank for their helpful 
comments Paul Caron, Robert Hillman, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Emily Sherwin. 
 1. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 98 (2d ed. 1991). 
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have slowly built an impressive set of schemata of Civil Procedure by reading 
cases and studying theory, by analogizing from related schemata, and by 
reflecting on the actual construction of each schema.  Our schemata allow us 
easily to incorporate new information.  They also facilitate solving new 
problems of doctrinal analysis, permitting us both to explain and to predict 
outcomes with relative ease and effectiveness.  Just consider how much easier 
it has become to answer students’ questions, or how much more tempting it 
now is to convey our structured views in oral debate or in published work. 
Although this feeling of mastery is probably realistic as well as undeniably 
satisfying, it can negatively affect teaching.  Knowledge is the root of some 
evil in teaching.  Things seem clear to us, so we try to explain them.  We shoot 
past the landmarks quickly, in order to cover the subsequent developments and 
to sketch the big picture.  We try, in short, to convey our schemata.  What we 
tend to forget is that law students are in class mainly to build their own 
schemata.2  Truly learning law is not a process of receiving the other’s 
understanding; it is rather a process of creating one’s own understanding. 
How do novices build schemata?  Most often they begin by studying 
exemplars.  They connect and organize the exemplars into a structure by the 
process of induction.  Other mental processes can later refine this schema, but 
the beginning is critical.  The students’ focus should be on fundamentals, not 
on filigree. 
As is already evident, my thesis, although a simple one, requires, first, a bit 
of background drawn from cognitive scientists on schema theory in the 
abstract, and then a little elaboration of its pedagogic implications for law 
schools. 
II.  SCHEMATA 
The “major accomplishment of cognitive science has been the clear 
demonstration of the validity of positing a level of mental representation.”3  
Although disputes persist as to details and even as to terminology, wide 
 
 2. See Richard John Stapleton & Deborah C. Stapleton, Teaching Business Using the Case 
Method and Transactional Analysis: A Constructivist Approach, 28 TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS 
J. 157, 157 (1998) (“The case can be made that schema change is at the root of significant 
learning,” with schema change necessarily performed by the students themselves, and with 
learning defined as a persisting change in disposition or capability that is not merely ascribable to 
growth.). 
 3. HOWARD GARDNER, THE MIND’S NEW SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE COGNITIVE 
REVOLUTION 383 (1985).  It is safer to stick to mainstream views as one ventures outside one’s 
field.  But see generally John Batt, Law, Science, and Narrative: Reflections on Brain Science, 
Electronic Media, Story, and Law Learning, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19 (1990) (invoking curious 
psychological theories to argue that legal pedagogy should set aside “bite” oriented casebooks in 
favor of riveting narrative, especially electronic narrative, in order to attain brain stimulation and 
learning). 
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agreement prevails on the existence of what many call schemata.  These 
structures in memory embody knowledge, whether about a stimulus or a 
concept, including its attributes and the relationships among these attributes.  
These schemata organize the world for the person, while telling the person 
which new inputs to seek out or to focus on and which to ignore.4 
Data-driven, bottom-up processes allow the person to actively construct a 
schema from exemplars encountered.  More general information, analogies, 
and metacognition help the person to elaborate the schema, by making 
connections multidimensionally and even generating idealized prototypes.  As 
learning progresses, the schema becomes more complex, but also more tightly 
organized, and, hence, more usable.  Furthermore, people arrange their 
individual schemata into a useful hierarchical pyramid that can embody 
complex knowledge, with the more inclusive schemata generally being higher 
in the hierarchy.5 
Schemata are in constant use mentally.  When a person processes data 
from the world, the existing schemata affect encoding, as the data fit into the 
appropriate niche.  Schemata affect recall, as people tend to forget schema-
irrelevant information and must have made a special processing effort in order 
later to remember schema-inconsistent information.  A person uses the 
appropriate schema to generate inferences where information is missing or, 
more generally, to engage in theory-driven and top-down processes.6 
More disagreement persists about how people use their schemata to 
categorize and solve problems.  But psychologists agree that what separates 
experts from novices is the quality of their schemata, whether the expert is a 
chess grandmaster or a law teacher.  In addressing a new problem, the expert 
does not retrieve all the details of past games or cases, but rather the 
appropriate schema extracted from them.  That schema then, in one way or 
another, generates a solution, such as a chess or legal move.7 
In any event, schemata are critical to converting novices into experts, so 
teachers are well-advised to attend to their students’ schema-building.  
Induction is a basic mental process in this task.  Teachers need, therefore, to 
 
 4. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 98.  For an instructive application of schema 
theory to the law, see Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 767 (2000) (stressing the negative effects of schemata on inference and 
explanation). 
 5. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 98-99, 105-07, 115-16, 147-49. 
 6. See id. at 121-39. 
 7. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and 
the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 335, 338 (1995).  For a nostalgic view of 
lawyers’ use of schemata generated by a case method, see ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST 
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993), reviewed by Gail Heriot, Songs of 
Experience: The Last Lawyer, 81 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (1995) (book review); R. George 
Wright, Whose Phronesis? Which Phronimoi?: A Response to Dean Kronman on Law School 
Education, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 817, 828-34 (1996). 
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provide students with well-selected exemplars, encouraging them to examine 
thoroughly these prime exemplars from many different angles.  A long string 
of half-comprehended exemplars likely produces a shakier foundation than a 
shorter series of well-pondered exemplars.  “The case method is essentially a 
constructivist learning approach.”8 
Of course, provision of exemplars is only the beginning of the teaching 
process.  Research indicates that better schemata result if the teacher directs the 
students’ building process by providing some theory that reveals 
connectedness and by suggesting source analogies.  Moreover, research also 
indicates that better schemata result if the student is actively involved in 
searching out source analogies and in thinking about the schema-building.  
Passive recipients of unconnected and two-dimensional information flounder, 
while directed and active students flourish.  The involved students build a 
sound schema and only later add most of their detailed information to it.9 
Unfortunately, then, there is no way directly to transplant a brilliant 
schema.  All the teacher can do is encourage and guide students in their own 
schema-building.  One law teacher summed up this cognitive understanding: 
  Most experienced law teachers have independently arrived, at least tacitly, 
at the result suggested by these experiments . . . .  And our resistance to pleas 
of “just give us the rules” springs from a sense of how people learn, rather than 
mere sadism.  It is the active process of comparing and contrasting appellate 
cases dealing with complex concepts that leads to an understanding of those 
concepts on a level deeper than one can get to from the propositional 
exposition of the hornbook or course outline.  Langdell’s “legal science” 
stands on firm ground in human cognition and learning, at least insofar as 
lawyering entails understanding doctrinal concepts and applying them in new 
situations . . . .10 
III.  PEDAGOGY 
The law schools’ case method is wonderfully suited to this challenging 
process of teaching basic law courses in common-law countries.  It is, of 
 
 8. Stapleton & Stapleton, supra note 2, at 159 (citations omitted). 
 9. See Blasi, supra note 7, at 336 n.53, 358-61, 386-87. 
 10. Id. at 359.  Earlier roots in England of the case method may have rested less on a theory 
of legal science and more on a sense of human learning.  The first casebook editor extolled the 
value to the student “of early mastering, as so many nuclei of future legal acquisitions, a few of 
the ‘leading cases’ in the Law Reports . . . .”  SAMUEL WARREN, MISCELLANIES: CRITICAL, 
IMAGINATIVE, AND JURIDICAL CONTRIBUTED TO BLACKWOOD’S MAGAZINE 73 (William 
Blackwood & Sons 1855), reprinted in 5 WORKS OF SAMUEL WARREN 73 (William Blackwood 
& Sons 1855); see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 5 (1995). 
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course, a remarkably inefficient and ineffective way to convey information.11  
But it squarely addresses the primary task of students’ schema-building.  From 
its U.S. beginnings in 1870, the case method has been attacked—foolishly for 
yielding obscurity, somewhat more insightfully for “call[ing] upon the student 
to produce a synthesis that only experts could properly produce . . . .”12  
Precisely!  “Rather than monologically telling students what they need to know 
for tests based on the teacher’s personal schemata, case method teachers 
colearn and coconstruct ‘reality’ with students in a dialectical, dialogical 
process.”13 
Now, my position here is a modest one really.  Unlike Dean Langdell, I am 
not claiming that the case method is the only way to teach law or even the best 
way.14  Other methods of group instruction that stress active learning seem to 
be as effective;15 also, the case method does flag in the upperclass years,16 and 
it is not effective for teaching many of the skills that a lawyer needs to 
master.17  Nor do I claim that our courses should teach doctrinally focused 
schema-building and nothing else, because much else goes on.  Nevertheless, 
the fact remains that the case method is the dominant teaching method for 
basic Civil Procedure, which still deals heavily with doctrine.  So, I maintain 
merely that if we try to use the case method, we should do it as well as we can. 
Yet we do not employ the case method as well as we can.  Various and 
nefarious incentives degrade our classroom style from interactive engagement 
(whether Socratic or otherwise) toward more of a lecture approach (whether 
high-tech or otherwise).18  So, too, do the aforementioned desires for broad 
 
 11. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 
215 (1948) (“For it is obvious that man could hardly devise a more wasteful method of imparting 
information about subject matter than the case-class.  Certainly man never has.”). 
 12. Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case 
System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 170 (1986) (citing Leslie J. Tompkins, The Lawyer’s 
Education, 15 AM. LAW. 423 (1907)). 
 13. Stapleton & Stapleton, supra note 2, at 160 (discussing business-school case method). 
 14. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi 
(Boston, Little, Brown 1871). 
 15. See Teich, supra note 12, at 168-69, 185.  It is perhaps worth noting that some of the 
modern methods alternative to the case method—such as narrative, simulation and problem 
methods—share the feature of an elaborated exemplar with the enriched case method.  See, e.g., 
Douglas L. Leslie, How Not to Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course: PowerPoint, Laptops, 
and the CaseFile Method, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1289, 1306-13 (2000) (describing a method that 
employs for each class period a different case file, consisting of a fictional fact pattern, a selection 
of authorities, and a partner’s assignment to an associate). 
 16. See Roger C. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
321, 328 (1982). 
 17. See Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57, 58-59 
(1992). 
 18. See David M. Becker, Some Concerns About the Future of Legal Education, 51 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 469 (2001); Leslie, supra note 15, at 1295-1306. 
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coverage and knowledge-sharing degrade our approach to the casebook, from a 
true case method, toward use of the book as a rather unclear treatise.  These 
classroom and casebook approaches combine to impede the students’ schema-
building, by diluting the exemplars’ power and by inducing passivity in the 
students.  As another law teacher put it: 
  Some professors use the case method to teach the rules of law: they go 
through a casebook by asking for the facts and holding of a case, and making 
sure the students understand the holding.  Then it’s on to the next case.  
Langdell might well cry out (while turning over in his grave): “Stop!  If that is 
all you’re doing, go back to using textbooks and lectures.  They explain the 
rules more clearly, accurately, and quickly than cases do.  Just find a good 
hornbook and read it to your students.”19 
We teachers need to adhere more closely to a purer case method, which 
might be called the enriched case method.  The essence is teaching a slightly 
smaller number of cases and pausing on the key ones, thoroughly examining 
them in a rich context.  The benefits of the enriched case method would be 
numerous.  For example, studying a case carefully, critically and actively 
teaches best that fundamental skill of how to “read a case.”  Most importantly, 
it provides the best raw materials for schema-building.  By building and then 
applying those schemata, the student learns what a lawyer needs to know and 
how to use that knowledge to “think like a lawyer.” 
Although I view improved schema-building as a sufficient justification for 
the enriched case method, other benefits would flow from elaborating an 
otherwise acontextual presentation of a case.  A thorough reading of the facts 
and proceedings helps students to understand the legal process, as to both 
dispute-processing and law-making;20 it shows the law in action, along with its 
various actors and especially lawyers likewise in action;21 it instructs on what 
the law values, and what the law does not;22 and, at the same time, it 
humanizes the law, showing the roles people play in creating law and the 
effects law has on people’s lives.23  Putting the case into its socio-economic-
 
 19. Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s Time to Teach With Problems, 42 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 241, 244 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
 20. See Judith L. Maute, Response: The Values of Legal Archaeology, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 
223, 223 (2001) (“Historical reconstruction is invaluable to understanding legal processes . . . .”). 
 21. See Robert A. Hillman, Enriching Case Reports, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1197, 1197 (2000) 
(“Judicial opinions in contract matters often fail to reflect the intricacies of a dispute, the nuances 
of the lawyer’s strategies in court and the general realities of litigation.”); id. at 1204 (“the study 
of actual contracts helps demonstrate that law consists of more than enactments of officials in 
power”). 
 22. See Joan Vogel, Cases in Context: Lake Champlain Wars, Gentrification and Ploof v. 
Putnam, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791, 795-97 (2001) (discussing use of case studies to introduce the 
outsider perspective). 
 23. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, 
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS, at xi (1976); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
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political context can illuminate the reasons for a judicial decision and its true 
meaning, while simultaneously attuning the students to the importance of 
viewing the law from the perspectives of many different academic 
disciplines.24  All these benefits are not a bad payoff for a method that 
incidentally makes the course more interesting and even more fun for the 
teacher and students.  And the benefits of context do not depend on 
commitment to some sort of deconstructionist jurisprudence. 
This variety of pedagogic and intellectual benefits explains the recent burst 
of attention to the genre of classic-case studies,25 with many appearing in 
collections and symposia in various subject areas (other than Civil 
Procedure).26  Scholars have produced or are in the process of producing the 
necessary raw materials.  But how should one incorporate these products of 
legal archaeology into one’s course?  A variety of possible ways to pursue the 
enriched case method suggest themselves. 
A. Enriched Casebooks 
One could rely on one’s chosen casebook to incorporate the contextual 
materials.  Some casebooks commendably include such materials for certain 
cases.  Most notably, the soon-to-be-revised Cover, Fiss and Resnik casebook27 
provides delightfully detailed coverage of several of its major cases, including, 
for example, Goldberg v. Kelly28 as the book’s introductory case.  They have 
the right idea.  The result, however, is a long book.  Moreover, as a general 
matter, casebook elaboration inevitably constrains a user, who in teaching 
cannot so easily pick which cases to pause on in a leisurely manner and which 
to pass through quickly.  Selectivity is a necessary aspect of the enriched case 
method. 
At any rate, one cannot expect many other casebook editors to rush to 
assist in one’s pursuit of the enriched case method.  Casebook editors have 
regrettably powerful reasons not to fill the need.  Case studies are a lot of work 
to prepare.  They add many pages to a casebook, and fear of length plagues 
 
Foreword, Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach Legal Ethics, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 787, 788, 793 (2000). 
 24. See Vogel, supra note 22, at 792-95. 
 25. See Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, 2000 
UTAH L. REV. 185, 186-87 (2001). 
 26. See, e.g., SIMPSON, supra note 10; Symposium, Case Studies in Legal Ethics, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000); Symposium, Teaching Contracts, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1443 
(2000); Symposium, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 183 (2001).  The interest seems to have recently 
increased, but the interest is not new.  See, e.g., RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN 
CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES (1978); NOONAN, supra note 
23. 
 27. ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988). 
 28. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), treated in COVER ET AL., supra note 27, at 37-112. 
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every casebook editor.  They provide little professional reward if published in 
a new edition of a going casebook and they risk alienating prior users of the 
casebook, who might not want to spend class time on pursuing the particular 
cases elaborated. 
This is not to say that casebook editors will not, or should not, take minor 
steps toward enriching their presentation of cases.  A little case background 
and follow-up go a long way in making the presentation more interesting and 
more effective.  A productive route in that direction was recently mapped by 
Professor Robert A. Hillman, who suggested that casebook editors contact the 
lawyers who litigated the more recent cases included in their casebook, asking 
the lawyers to share material from their case files.29  This practice would 
facilitate introducing into the casebook excerpts of briefs and other court 
documents, as well as the lawyers’ letters and other work product. 
Incidentally, proposing improvements of this sort is not a dig at casebook 
editors for their close editing of cases.30  Some users do complain that the cases 
in modern casebooks are too closely edited, so that students get neither the full 
flavor of the opinions nor, more importantly in these users’ view, the 
experience of reading and dissecting cases in their native state.  Yet casebook 
pages are just too precious to expend on loose editing.  In the first place, 
assignments can be only so long before exhausting students’ diligence and 
patience.  Moreover, their pre-class preparation should comprise focused work.  
Finally, loose editing accomplishes little: it does not directly serve the purpose 
of schema-building, which calls for the addition of relevant detail and 
perspective, not for additional irrelevancies; nor is it essential to students’ 
training, because they should get plenty of practice in addressing unedited 
cases elsewhere in their law-school experience. 
B. Parallel Case 
The more reliable route to follow, then, is to supplement the chosen 
casebook.  Some teachers create their own running exemplar from a real or 
imagined case, providing a fact pattern and sample documents and referring to 
the case throughout the course.31  Many more teachers use one of the excellent 
 
 29. Hillman, supra note 21 (describing his contracts casebook).  Another interesting route is 
the teaching technique proposed by Patricia D. White, Afterword and Response: What Digging 
Does and Does Not Do, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 301, 302-03 (2001) (assigning her first-year tort 
students to pick a case and prepare a full case study covering the record and the context). 
 30. I would be more prepared to criticize the editorial practice of adding after cases all those 
countless, cryptic notes on vaguely related issues.  See Leslie, supra note 15, at 1300-03. 
 31. See, e.g., Posting of Rogelio Lasso, Professor, Washburn University School of Law, 
zzlass@washburn.edu, to Civil Procedure Listserve, civpro@law.wisc.edu (June 11, 2002) (on 
file with author) (“I found that using A Civil Action or other materials was too time demanding so 
for the past couple of years designed my own ‘class case,’ which is usually an amalgam of several 
complex cases, usually tort cases.  The class case is usually two or three single space pages that 
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paperback books that similarly provide a single case as an illustrative long-
term parallel.32  Two recent ones, for superb examples, employ A Civil Action33 
and President Clinton’s sexual harassment litigation.34 
Such a supplementary approach can be very productive for certain 
purposes.  I have used, and still use, one or another of these supplemental 
books in my own first-year class.  But this approach does not, by itself, achieve 
all the ends of the enriched case method, notably because that method depends 
on multiple exemplars.  Moreover, this supplemental approach can have some 
problems, because the supplemental book can be hard to integrate with the 
casebook.  My own consequent difficulty is that I tend to lapse, especially after 
using the same supplemental book for a few years, into leaving it mainly to the 
students’ independent reading, thereby defeating some of its purposes. 
C. Case Studies 
The more effective way to achieve the ends of the enriched case method, 
therefore, is to supplement intermittently as the class reaches key cases in the 
casebook.  We all do this to some degree in the classroom, by injecting 
contextual information orally that we might have acquired by our own 
research, by word-of-mouth over the years, or by gleaning it from the teacher’s 
manual for the casebook.  Indeed, casebook editors frequently convey the juicy 
stuff privately in their manual with the intent of enabling the teachers to jazz 
up their class by springing the information on the students.  But such intent and 
means are hardly conducive to providing the real enrichment needed. 
 
include names of injured parties, potential wrongdoers, and detailed accounts of ‘what happened.’ 
We begin the semester by meeting the injured parties and one or more defendant as potential 
‘clients’ and we refer to the class case from the beginning, to determine if we should take the 
case, to using the class case facts and the rules to draft simple complaints, discuss how we can 
attack a complaint, figure out a discovery plan, etc.”). 
 32. E.g., DAVID CRUMP & JEFFREY B. BERMAN, THE STORY OF A CIVIL CASE (3d ed. 
2001); MARC A. FRANKLIN, THE BIOGRAPHY OF A LEGAL DISPUTE (1968); JOSEPH W. 
GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 523-630 (4th ed. 2001); SAMUEL 
MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1982); PETER N. SIMON, THE ANATOMY OF A 
LAWSUIT (rev. ed. 1996); GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976) (related 
film clips available at http://ns.appalshop.org/film/buffalo/), discussed in Lawrence M. Grosberg, 
The Buffalo Creek Disaster: An Effective Supplement to a Conventional Civil Procedure Course, 
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 378 (1987); BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY’S LEGAL STRUGGLES 
IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE (1998); WILLIAM ZELERMYER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN OPERATION 
(1977). 
 33. LEWIS A. GROSSMAN & ROBERT G. VAUGHN, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO A 
CIVIL ACTION WITH NOTES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS (rev. ed. 2002) (treating JONATHAN 
HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995)). 
 34. NAN D. HUNTER, THE POWER OF PROCEDURE: THE LITIGATION OF JONES V. CLINTON 
(2002) (treating Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)). 
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Because a quick aside is unlikely to work, assigned reading (of moderate 
length, of course) is the optimal way to go.  Basically, the extra assignment 
will compel the students to ponder the key case, examining it from various 
angles and milking it for multiple lessons—this is, after all, the aim of the 
enriched case method.  The reading encourages the students to build a solid 
schema, as they incorporate more information into their schema and make new 
connections within their schema.  They will, at the least, realize that their study 
is supposed to involve more than unearthing the case’s holding.  Incidentally, 
the very act of assigning extra reading for the particular day forces the teacher 
to pause on the elaborated case. 
This approach of intermittent supplementation by assigned readings might 
depend on the teacher’s compiling a personal collection of readings, drawn 
from the existing but scattered books and articles treating the landmark cases 
of Civil Procedure.35  An easier way would be to assign a pre-existing 
collection.  The fine Civil Procedure Anthology36 moves toward opening this 
option.  Its last section presents four articles constituting case studies of 
Pennoyer,37 World-Wide Volkswagen,38 Erie39 and Hickman.40 
An alternative appears now on the horizon.  Last year, Professor Paul 
Caron submitted a book proposal to the Foundation Press for Tax Stories: An 
In-Depth Look at the Ten Leading Federal Income Tax Cases.  Upon approval, 
 
 35. E.g., GEORGE DARGO, LAW IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 107–36 (1983) (treating Livingston 
v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811)), revising GEORGE DARGO, PUBLIC POWER AND 
PRIVATIZATION 114–70 (1980); Ronan E. Degnan, Livingston v. Jefferson—A Freestanding 
Footnote, 75 CAL. L. REV. 115 (1987); ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974) (treating Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)); C. 
Michael Abbott & Donald C. Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in 
the Legal Services Program, 57 IOWA L. REV. 955 (1972) (treating Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67 (1972)); Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum 
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769 
(1995) (treating Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
 36. DAVID I. LEVINE, DONALD L. DOERNBERG & MELISSA L. NELKEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
ANTHOLOGY 541-76 (1998). 
 37. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), treated in Wendy C. Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and 
Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 
479 (1987). 
 38. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), treated in Charles W. 
Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson—The Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122 
(1993) (In a heart-rending description of the accident and the litigation, reports the significant fact 
that the plaintiffs joined the distributor and retailer in order to defeat removal and thus stay in a 
state court known for high verdicts; soon after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, the case was in 
fact removed and the Robinsons lost at trial.). 
 39. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), treated in Bob Rizzi, Erie Memoirs Reveal 
Drama, Tragedy, HARV. L. REC., Sept. 24, 1976, at 2. 
 40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), treated in Paul Coady, Dredging the Depths of 
Hickman v. Taylor, HARV. L. REC., May 6, 1977, at 2. 
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he signed ten leading tax scholars to prepare the studies on the foundational 
cases of tax law.  Also, he convinced Foundation to create a whole new “Law 
Stories” series of books, of which he would be the series editor.41  Torts Stories 
(edited by Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman), Property Stories (edited 
by Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Moriss), Constitutional Law Stories (edited 
by Michael C. Dorf), Criminal Law Stories (edited by Robert Weisberg), and 
Contracts Stories (edited by Douglas G. Baird) are already in the pipeline.  
Following the publication of the tax book in late 2002, the plan is to begin the 
roll-out of Law Stories for first-year courses before the fall semester of 2003, 
with the remainder of the first-year books appearing before the following fall.  
Law Stories for additional second- and third-year courses will follow. 
Now, dear reader, here comes the plug.  So you can stop reading.  But 
quickly in my defense, it is a sincere plug, motivated by my own genuine 
concerns over the increasingly explanatory teaching style into which I have 
been falling. 
Civil Procedure Stories: An In-Depth Look at the Leading Civil Procedure 
Cases, which I shall edit, will be part of this new series.  This project will 
involve a collaborative effort by a dozen law-school professors to provide a 
deeper understanding of a dozen great cases.  The selected cases will cover 
much of the range of the existing law of Civil Procedure.  Each of the 
professors will write a thirty-page chapter on one of the cases.  The end 
product, which will appear in the late spring of 2004, will consist of a 
paperback book of approximately 400 pages. 
The resulting book will tell the stories behind the cases.  It also will help 
students, as well as academics and practitioners, better appreciate the historical 
context of these cases and the role they continue to play in our current debates.  
A subtheme running throughout the book will be the special role of 
interdisciplinary methods and different perspectives necessary to the study of 
civil procedure.  Each chapter will have a consistent structure, with separate 
sections on: 
 
 social and legal background of the case; 
 
 factual background of the case; 
 
 lower court proceedings in the case; 
 




 41. See Paul L. Caron, Back to the Future: Teaching Law Through Stories, 71 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2002). 
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 impact of the case on the development of the law (why the case is 
famous and when it became so); and 
 
 importance of the case today (why it continues to be a leading case). 
 
The analysis of the proceedings and disposition will discuss the positions taken 
in the briefs by the parties and describe the oral argument.  The analysis of the 
influence of the case on the law, then and now, will consider the reaction of 
contemporary commentators and also later judicial and legislative adjustments. 
An introduction, written by me, will draw lessons from the study of these 
leading cases, in terms of the development of Civil Procedure as well as the 
role of interdisciplinary approaches and diverse perspectives in understanding 
that development.  I shall also produce an accompanying Web site, which 
could serve as a research tool for students, academics, and practitioners.  The 
site will comprise the following material with respect to each of the cases 
featured in the book: 
 
 actual pleadings and other documents figuring in the case; 
 
 lower court opinions; 
 
 briefs of the parties and amici curiae; 
 
 audiotapes (which exist for all post-1954 Supreme Court decisions) and 
transcripts (which exist post-1934) of oral arguments or, for older cases, 
the summaries from the old reporters of oral arguments; 
 
 final appellate opinion; and 
 
 any relevant visual enhancement available. 
 
Okay, so which will be the cases?  The cases selected should be ones that 
(1) appear in most of the major civil procedure casebooks, (2) are foundational 
in the sense that they were significant in the development of the law and 
continue to shape the law, and (3) have a particularly interesting story to tell 
based on their facts and historical context.  Given these criteria, the cases will 
probably all be Supreme Court cases.  Although it would be impossible for 
everyone to agree on a “top ten or so” list, it should be possible to conceive a 
list that enjoys widespread acceptance in the Civil Procedure community.  
Tentatively, then, I envision these cases for Civil Procedure Stories, arranged 
in this structure: 
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I. SYSTEM 
 A. ADJUDICATORY–Goldberg.42  This well-known case exposes the values 
expressed by our formal system of adjudication, as the Court 
determined the procedure that is due before the state terminates welfare 
benefits. 
 
 B. ADVERSARIAL–Lassiter.43  The squirm-worthy facts and the clashing 
opinions of this eminently teachable case put the values of our 
adversary system on exhibit, as the Court determined the representation 
that is due before the state terminates a parent’s rights. 
II. FORUM 
 A. GOVERNING LAW–Erie.44  Exploration of Civil Procedure’s most 
famous case, while illustrating the application of historical methods, 
illuminates federal-state relations for the student. 
 
 B. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION–Owen.45  The facts of this leading case 
on supplemental jurisdiction are so perfect that they seem to have been 
hypothesized solely for classroom use, and the background of how the 
Congress, the courts, and the lawyers have gone about addressing this 
jurisdictional problem does wonders to teach the legal process. 
 
 C. TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY TO ADJUDICATE–Shaffer.46  While many 
classic cases could expose the workings of interstate federalism, this 
case was the first to explicitly combine into today’s law the themes of 
power and reasonableness, and then to apply them to nonpersonal as 
well as personal jurisdiction. 
 
 42. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), treated in COVER ET AL., supra note 27, at 37-
112. 
 43. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), treated in Lowell F. Schechter, The 
Pitfalls of Timidity: The Ramifications of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 8 N. KY. L. 
REV. 435 (1981). 
 44. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), treated in EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE 
POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 95-191 (2000), reviewed 
by Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829 (2001) 
(book review).  See also TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 101-53 (1981); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES! 200 YEARS OF 
AMERICAN LAW 216-29 (1976); Aaron L. Danzig, Erie v. Tompkins at 50: Due a Respectful 
Burial?, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 26, 1988, at 6; Rizzi, supra note 39; Irving Younger, What Happened in 
Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1978). 
 45. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
 46. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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 D. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS–Connecticut v. Doehr.47  This, perhaps, 
most important case on procedural due process managed to rationalize 
the Court’s earlier confusing decisions on pre-judgment seizure of 
property for security, but it requires for understanding the use of law-
and-economics analysis. 
III.  PRETRIAL 
A. PARTIES–Hansberry.48  On marvelously revealing facts, this classic 
case not only explores the substantive side of due process, but also 
introduces the subject of complex litigation. 
 
B. PLEADINGS–Conley.49  This ultimate case on notice pleading provides 
the stage for consideration of the models of procedure, as it invites 
tracing the movement from the issue pleading of the common law to 
the fact pleading of the code system to modern procedure. 
 
C. DISCOVERY–Hickman.50  The context of this great case on discovery of 
work product showcases the rulemaking process, while the case itself 
compels consideration of the adversary system and the lawyers’ 
professional role therein. 
 
D. MOTIONS–Celotex.51  This best case on summary judgment also gives 
an opportunity to investigate the impact of procedure on substance. 
 
IV.  TRIAL–Colgrove.52  This case that authorized six-person civil juries 
not only treats trial in its most important aspect of the jury right, but also opens 
the widest portal to consideration of social-science methodologies in the law. 
 
V.  JUDGMENT–Hilton.53  This sole foray by the Court into international 
recognition and enforcement of judgments has had, since 1895, a peculiarly 
 
 47. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 48. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), treated in Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind 
Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 481 (1987). 
 49. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 50. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), treated in Coady, supra note 40. 
 51. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), treated in RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN 
KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 650-
62 (7th ed. 1997). 
 52. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). 
 53. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), treated in Richard H. M. Maloy & Desamparados 
M. Nisi, A Message to the Supreme Court: The Next Time You Get a Chance, Please Look at 
Hilton v. Guyot; We Think It Needs Repairing, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999). 
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indirect effect on U.S. law, but accelerating globalization is now pushing the 
case into the foreground of treaty negotiations and national lawmaking. 
CONCLUSION 
We Civil Procedure teachers could do a better instructional job by 
contextually enriching the presentation of a number of the key cases in our 
courses.  A happy fact is that availability of the requisite written materials 
makes doing so increasingly feasible. 
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